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Institutional complexity and individual responses: delineating the boundaries of partial 1 
autonomy 2 
Abstract 3 
Research highlights how co-existing institutional logics can sometimes offer opportunities for 4 
agency to enterprising actors in organizational fields. But macro- and micro-level studies using 5 
this framework diverge in their approach to understanding the consequences of institutional 6 
complexity for actor autonomy, and correspondingly in the opportunities they identify for 7 
agents to resist, reinterpret or make judicious use of institutional prescriptions. This paper seeks 8 
to bridge this gap, through a longitudinal, comparative case study of the trajectories of four 9 
ostensibly similar change initiatives in the same complex organizational field. It studies the 10 
influence of three dominant institutional logics (professional, market and corporate) in these 11 
divergent trajectories, elucidating the role of mediating influences, operating below the level 12 
of the field but above that of the actor, that worked to constrain or facilitate agency. The 13 
consequence for actors was a divergent realization of the relationship between the three logics, 14 
with very different consequences for their ability to advance their interests. Our findings offer 15 
an improved understanding of when and how institutional complexity facilitates autonomy, 16 
and suggests mediating influences at the level of the organization and the relationship it 17 
instantiates between carriers of logics, neglected by macro- and micro-level studies, that merit 18 
further attention. 19 
Keywords 20 
Institutions; institutional logics; healthcare; professionalism; managerialism; markets; National 21 
Health Service; England 22 
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Introduction 23 
Academic understanding of conformity, differentiation and change in organizational fields has 24 
been advanced in recent years by a burgeoning literature drawing on the concept of institutional 25 
logics. From its foundations in neo-institutionalism, the institutional logics perspective has 26 
rapidly advanced to theorize how diverse institutional forces not only compete for dominance, 27 
but also frequently interact and co-exist, and how this affects organizational and individual 28 
behaviour. It offers a rich explanatory framework that accounts for heterogeneity as well as 29 
conformity, and which better allows for the potential of agency as well as structure in enacting, 30 
contesting and transforming institutions. 31 
Within this approach, a particularly vibrant thread of research has focused on the 32 
consequences of institutional complexity—that is, the presence of multiple logics with 33 
conflicting, or at least diverging, prescriptions for behaviour. At the macro level, theoretical 34 
and empirical studies have, as a rule, found that institutional complexity adds further 35 
constraints to organizations’ and individuals’ behaviour, since it poses expectations from 36 
additional audiences, all of whom must be satisfied for legitimacy (Pache & Santos 2010; 37 
Kraatz & Block 2008). Yet such predictions have not always been borne out in micro-level 38 
studies of individual behaviour under conditions of complexity, which often find that actors 39 
‘on the ground’ exercise a remarkable degree of autonomy in their day-to-day practice (e.g. 40 
Hallett 2010). The objective of this study, therefore, is to attempt to bridge this gap, through a 41 
longitudinal comparative case study of the consequences of a period of intensifying 42 
institutional complexity for actor autonomy, in the English National Health Service (NHS). 43 
Existing theory predicts that this period of change, which saw the increasing centralization and 44 
formalization of institutional expectations (Pache & Santos 2010; Greenwood et al. 2011; 45 
Thornton 2002), would impose more exacting expectations on individual-level behaviour. But 46 
we found a mixed picture, with two cases remaining recalcitrant to changing institutional 47 
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prescriptions, while in two others actors’ behaviour was more conforming. We seek to add to 48 
an emerging literature on organizational-level factors in the constitution of institutional logics 49 
(e.g. Besharov & Smith 2014) by elucidating this meso-level influence on the degree of latitude 50 
enjoyed by actors in the face of apparently determinative institutional prescriptions. In so 51 
doing, we outline alternative forms of organizational influence on the experience of logics ‘on 52 
the ground’, and begin to identify the building blocks for a bridge between macro-level and 53 
micro-level work on institutional logics that has to date been missing. We respond to calls for 54 
research that takes seriously the partial and contingent nature of agency in institutional fields 55 
(Thornton et al. 2012; Greenwood et al. 2010; Waldorff et al. 2013), and accounts for 56 
institutional complexity more adequately by considering more than two logics (Greenwood et 57 
al. 2010; 2011; Goodrick & Reay 2011). 58 
We begin by reviewing the institutional logics literature, including its propositions on 59 
how logics co-exist, and how actors respond to this. We highlight the disconnection between 60 
macro- and micro-level studies, and argue that, while micro-level studies have gone some way 61 
to fulfilling their promise of returning neo-institutionalism to its ‘microfoundations’ (Powell & 62 
Colyvas 2008), the methodological approaches predominant in this literature mean that in 63 
aggregate it risks overstating the “avenues for partial autonomy” (Thornton et al. 2012, p.7) 64 
available to individual actors. Then we briefly describe our empirical setting, a particularly 65 
complex institutional field in terms of the dimensions set out by Greenwood et al. (2011). After 66 
accounting for our methods, we explore the dynamics of institutional change and the divergent 67 
consequences for our four cases through time. We then discuss our findings and their 68 
implications for theory and future research. 69 
Institutional logics: coexistence and its consequences 70 
Over the last 15-20 years, the institutional logics approach has offered an increasingly 71 
sophisticated means of accounting for change and stability in organizational fields. Institutional 72 
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logics are “the socially constructed, historical pattern of material practices, assumptions, 73 
values, beliefs, and rules by which individuals produce and reproduce their material 74 
subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & 75 
Ocasio 1998, p.804). In other words, institutional logics are the key means by which social 76 
reality is reproduced and changed. Distinctive domains of social practice—organizational 77 
fields—have their own sets of institutional logics, derived from societal-level logics, from the 78 
logics of neighbouring fields, and from the endogenous action of the individuals who populate 79 
them (Thornton et al. 2012). 80 
Formative research within the institutional logics approach focused primarily on the 81 
dominance of given logics: how this was created, maintained and challenged (e.g. Scott et al. 82 
2000). Increasingly, however, research has found that many fields are characterized by the co-83 
existence of a plurality of logics—often with no single logic dominant in determining actors’ 84 
disposition and behaviour. Rather than representing a temporary, transitional phase between 85 
epochs of dominance by a single logic, “some fields are better portrayed as leaning towards the 86 
‘relative incoherence’ of enduring, competing logics” (Greenwood et al. 2011, p.323). 87 
Greenwood et al. (2011, p.332) note that research on institutional complexity has tended to 88 
assume that coexisting logics are “inherently incompatible,” but more recent studies have 89 
challenged this assumption. Several have found that contradictory logics may coexist in an 90 
organizational field, often in a kind of ‘creative tension’ which means that their influences 91 
affect actors simultaneously (e.g. Reay & Hinings 2005; 2009; Lounsbury 2007; Greenwood 92 
et al. 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011; self-citation). The plurality of institutional prescriptions 93 
available means that a diversity of actor behaviours is often in evidence: for example, 94 
Lounsbury (2007) finds that different fund managers operate according to ‘trustee’ and 95 
‘performance’ logics concurrently, depending on their geographical location. 96 
The presence of divergent behaviours, however, should not automatically be interpreted 97 
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as signalling greater actor autonomy. The influence of logics, studies have found, is often 98 
‘segmented’, such that different groups of actors are affected differentially by logics’ 99 
prescriptions (Reay & Hinings 2009; Pache & Santos 2010; Goodrick & Reay 2011). Reay and 100 
Hinings (2009, p.646), for example, find that the rivalry between an incumbent logic of medical 101 
professionalism and an increasingly powerful logic of business-like healthcare is managed by 102 
collaboration between physicians and administrators, with each group maintaining its 103 
independence but engaging “in collaborations that result in mutually desirable outcomes and 104 
thus sustain the co-existing logics.” Often, therefore, studies of sustained institutional 105 
complexity find that carriers of different logics—for example, professional and managerial 106 
groups—remain bound to their ‘home’ logics and referent audiences, and are able to continue 107 
to act in accordance with their expectations. Alternatively, the same group of actors may have 108 
to satisfy the expectations of more than one audience for legitimacy, such that different aspects 109 
of their practice are governed by different logics (e.g. Smets et al. 2015). 110 
To observe that multiple logics are available within a field, therefore, is not to imply that 111 
individuals are able to pick and choose freely from their prescriptions. Due to their prior 112 
socialization, the expectations of their referent audiences, and other structural determinants, 113 
actors continue to face the constraints presented by the need for legitimacy, as identified by the 114 
earliest exponents of neo-institutionalism. The most recent developments in our understanding 115 
of the consequences of institutionally complex fields for actor autonomy arguably retain this 116 
structural focus. A promising recent line of inquiry is the consequences of the specific 117 
configuration of logics in a field: the ‘constellation’ in which they are formed (Reay & Hinings 118 
2009; Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 2013). The same logics may be configured 119 
differently in different fields, with important consequences for actor behaviour, as Waldorff et 120 
al. (2013) demonstrate with a comparison of Danish and Canadian healthcare. A similar set of 121 
logics existed in each setting, but they were arranged in rather different constellations, so that 122 
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a complementary relationship between market and professional logics in Canada led to changes 123 
in behaviour that did not arise in Denmark, where the relationship was more antagonistic. 124 
Waldorff et al. (2013, p.125) claim that “the concept of constellation of logics [offers] a new 125 
way of understanding agency. We see that it is the arrangement and relationship among logics 126 
that helps to explain how action can be both constrained and enabled.” Yet their analysis 127 
remains at the level of the field: the constellation of logics is a product of field-level dynamics 128 
(most notably, in this example, incentive structures and regulatory regimes), and these 129 
determine the repertoires available to different actors. There is less sense in such analyses of 130 
the way, as Smets and Jarzabkowski (2013, p.1301) have it, “constellations are constructed 131 
rather than given, and which dimensions of agency drive their construction.” 132 
Partly in response to the shortcomings of the macro-level focus of much of the work on 133 
institutional logics, another—largely separate—body of literature considers the micro-level 134 
enactment of logics by individuals at the ‘coalface’ (Barley 2008) of everyday work—that is, 135 
the unremarkable, day-to-day interactions of actors in institutionalized fields, far removed from 136 
the battles between institutions and high-level institutional entrepreneurs. Scholars in this line 137 
argue that much neo-institutional research neglects “interpretation and subjectivity, which […] 138 
offers considerable degrees of agency and freedom to reinterpret and even change institutional 139 
templates” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015). Where institutionalists have considered agency, they 140 
have focused disproportionately on what Smets et al. (2012, p.878) call “‘hypermuscular’ 141 
institutional entrepreneurship”: the work of “heroic actors” (Powell & Colyvas 2008, p.277) 142 
with unusual levels of individual or collective clout, who feed back into the constitution of 143 
institutional logics themselves (e.g. Greenwood et al. 2002; Murray 2010). What this neglects, 144 
critics argue, is the everyday work of lower-profile actors who nevertheless are active in their 145 
interpretation and application of institutional logics. 146 
Accordingly, work on ‘inhabited institutions’ (Hallett & Ventresca 2006) has examined 147 
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the lived experience of actors in institutionalized fields, and the practices they pursue, 148 
consciously or unconsciously, that reproduce or challenge institutional expectations. Often 149 
deploying ethnomethodological approaches, these studies highlight the interpretive, non-150 
deterministic processes that translate situations of institutional complexity into day-to-day 151 
reality (e.g. Heimer 1999; Binder 2007; Hallett 2010; Everitt 2013; McPherson & Sauder 2013; 152 
Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; Smets et al. 2015). They vividly demonstrate Powell and 153 
Colyvas’s  (2008, p.277) assertion that a division between “heroic actors and cultural dopes 154 
[is] a poor representation of the gamut of human behavior.” For example, Binder (2007) shows 155 
how professionals in different parts of the same organization meld together institutional 156 
demands, personal beliefs and localized meaning systems in the way they enact their 157 
organization’s mission. Everitt (2013) looks at the professional socialization of teachers as 158 
agentic and active, combining institutional prescriptions with social influences and personal 159 
preferences. Such work focuses above all on the everyday work of actors who are not in the 160 
business of “intentionally pursuing a clear institutional ‘vision’” (Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013, 161 
p.1300): they are not seeking to transform the rules of the game in an institutional field, but to 162 
forge a legitimate path through complex organizational settings characterized by a profusion 163 
of prescriptions, power relationships and personal interests (Smets et al. 2015). 164 
Taken together, these studies provide an important corrective to neo-institutionalism’s 165 
focus on the power of institutional logics. Yet their key methodological advantage—detailed 166 
examination of practice as it takes place in real-life environments—also creates a limitation. 167 
With few exceptions, these papers offer in-depth understanding of single organizations or even 168 
single organizational sub-units, rather than cross-sectional comparisons. This means that they 169 
are unlikely to reveal organizational-level contingencies in the way that, for example, a 170 
comparative case-study approach might. They also tend to ascribe a remarkable degree of 171 
autonomy to individual actors—perhaps in consequence of case selection, or of a desire to 172 
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challenge the structuralist predictions of macro-level studies, or of the preferences of journals 173 
for studies that indicate new or unexpected findings. In aggregate, these studies suggest that 174 
actors enjoy a great deal of latitude, in contradiction to the findings of the macro-level 175 
institutionalist literature. If a macro-level focus fetishizes structure, then a risk of a micro-level 176 
focus is fetishizing agency. Thus, echoing Hardy and Maguire’s (2008, p.199) critique of the 177 
institutional entrepreneurship literature, we need to “ensure that the efforts of institutional 178 
theorists to incorporate agency—in order to move beyond an over-emphasis on the constraining 179 
effects of institutions—do not swing too far in the opposite direction.” 180 
What has been less prominent in the literature is examination of the circumstances in 181 
which such agency is possible. With this in mind, our study considers the consequences of 182 
institutional complexity, and rapid institutional change, in four organizations in the same field, 183 
which exhibited divergent outcomes in terms of the room for manoeuvre achieved by the 184 
central actors, each of whom sought to maintain a novel service intervention that became 185 
misaligned with the prescriptions of the dominant logic within the field. We sacrifice the 186 
ethnomethodological depth of the ‘inhabited institutions’ tradition for comparative breadth, but 187 
nevertheless offer a detailed, qualitative, longitudinal study covering seven years of change. 188 
Our approach is not without precedent: the work of Reay and Hinings (2005; 2009) similarly 189 
combines field-level analysis with qualitative interviews with key actors, but whereas their 190 
focus is the consequences for the composition of the field, ours is the consequences for the 191 
autonomy of everyday actors (not muscular institutional entrepreneurs) at the coalface. 192 
Whereas the success of institutional entrepreneurs is often attributed to the power deriving from 193 
their social position or to exceptional creative vision (Hardy & Maguire 2008), we address the 194 
question of what enables or constrains these ‘coalface’ actors, who cannot rely on such 195 
attributes, in acting autonomously. We ask: what are the conditions that precipitate and inhibit 196 
actors’ ability to defy changing institutional prescriptions in defence of their own beliefs and 197 
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interests? 198 
Institutional logics in English healthcare, 2005-2011 199 
The field of healthcare is quintessentially institutionally complex. It has offered a fertile ground 200 
for the development of institutional theory, with key contributions arising from analysis of 201 
healthcare systems globally (e.g. Scott et al. 2000; Reay & Hinings 2005). As Pache and Santos 202 
(2010) note, healthcare is a fragmented field where stakeholders from a wide range of logics 203 
co-exist, but is also dependent on a small number of resource providers (in England’s case, the 204 
state). “The most complex fields for organizations to navigate,” argue Pache and Santos (2010, 205 
p.458), “are moderately centralized fields” of this kind, “characterized by the competing 206 
influence of multiple and misaligned players whose influence is not dominant yet is potent 207 
enough to be imposed on organizations.” Besharov and Smith (2014) conceptualize such fields 208 
as combining ‘high centrality’ (with multiple logics central to organizational functioning) with 209 
‘low compatibility’ (because the logics’ prescriptions are contradictory), and suggest that such 210 
fields produce ‘contested’ organizations characterized by extensive conflict. 211 
In common with healthcare systems worldwide (e.g. Scott et al. 2000), the NHS is the 212 
site of long-term conflict among logics. Of particular note is the influence of the professional, 213 
corporate and market logics. The professional logic in healthcare can be characterized as the 214 
dominance of professionals over not just clinical but organizational decision-making, and 215 
deference among others (managers, patients and lower-status clinicians) to (medical) 216 
professional knowledge (Reay & Hinings 2009). The market and corporate logics are 217 
sometimes conflated (e.g. [self-citation]), but we follow Thornton (2002) in distinguishing 218 
between them as two potentially complementary, but conceptually separate, institutional 219 
logics. The corporate logic is realized through managerial techniques for controlling 220 
professionals’ activity, for example performance-management regimes, standardization of 221 
clinical care, and development of capacity for surveillance and audit. The market logic 222 
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represents a shift towards use of competition among providers and market signals to induce 223 
improvement and contain costs. Traditionally dominated by medical professionalism, the 224 
English system was subject to increasing managerial and market influences from the 1980s 225 
onward, as the state sought to challenge professional jurisdictions and provider monopolies as 226 
part of wider ‘new public management’-style reforms (Ferlie 1996). Within this longer-term 227 
shift in the balance of logics, the period of our study, 2005-2011, can be seen as a particularly 228 
turbulent period of change, marking as it did the end of an unprecedented increase in healthcare 229 
spending in England, followed by a rapid retrenchment into austerity. Government funding for 230 
healthcare rose rapidly in the early 2000s (at a real-terms rate of 7% per annum) before 231 
plateauing and finally declining slightly relative to GDP (OECD 2014). The exogenous jolt of 232 
the global financial crisis from 2008 was partly responsible for this transition, but by this point 233 
the government had already begun to shift its focus from increasing capacity to increasing 234 
productivity (Secretary of State for Health 2008). In 2006 the government required that the 235 
NHS’s £520-million deficit be transformed into a £250-million surplus by 2008 (Day 2006), 236 
and as the financial situation became straitened, in 2009 the NHS chief executive called for 237 
efficiency savings of 20% within five years (Nicholson 2009). 238 
This turnaround in the financial environment translated into pronounced shifts in the 239 
organizational field, with the government seeking to increase the influence of market and 240 
corporate logics. Firstly, in line with the corporate logic, there was an increased emphasis on 241 
more managerial approaches to improving quality (e.g. care pathways, skill-mix 242 
reconfiguration) (Secretary of State for Health 2008). Secondly, again following the corporate 243 
logic, the government introduced a more intensive regime of performance management of NHS 244 
provider organizations, including a pledge to reduce waiting lists to 18 weeks, backed by the 245 
ability to invoke Draconian sanctions against ‘failing’ organizations (Lewis & Appleby 2006). 246 
Thirdly, following the market logic, the government took renewed steps to increase 247 
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competition in the NHS. Although an internal market for acute healthcare services had existed 248 
since the early 1990s, further steps were taken from 2006 to extend the scope of the market, by 249 
increasing service provision outside traditional hospitals (Secretary of State for Health 2006), 250 
increasing the power of ‘commissioners’ (holders of healthcare budgets for a locality, 251 
responsible for paying for the healthcare needs of the local population) over providers (Ham 252 
2008), and removing all responsibility for providing care from commissioning organizations, 253 
known as primary care trusts (PCTs), so that services were tendered competitively rather than 254 
offered ‘in house’. Thus there was a sustained effort to ensure that the logic of the market 255 
pervaded the entire healthcare system, including areas that had previously been immune to its 256 
influence. 257 
This period, then, was characterized by particularly intensive change, as government 258 
sought to adapt to the end of a period of sustained increases in funding by introducing evermore 259 
extensive market and managerial policies into the NHS system. Of course, changes in policy 260 
do not instantaneously give rise to a shift in the logics governing actors’ behaviour; 261 
nevertheless we can detect in these policies an attempt to strengthen the market and corporate 262 
logics—and correspondingly weaken the professional logic. At the start of the period, the NHS 263 
was enjoying unprecedented real-terms increases in funding; by the end, it was facing 264 
unprecedented levels of efficiency savings. A system of performance management that was 265 
emerging at the start had grown into a fully-fledged set of central-government prescriptions by 266 
the end, accompanied by the ability to ‘punish’ non-compliant or ineffective organizations with 267 
sanctions or wholesale replacement of management. At the beginning, only secondary-care 268 
services provided by hospitals were subject to a competitive system of resource allocation, but 269 
by the end all community-based services, previously provided in-house by PCTs, were exposed 270 
to the same expectation. The period was thus characterized by great institutional turbulence, 271 
with increasing centralization and formalization (Greenwood et al. 2011; Pache & Santos 272 
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2010) of the market and corporate logics. 273 
Setting and methods 274 
Our paper follows the trajectory of four new service developments over this period, through a 275 
longitudinal understanding over the period 2005-2011 of how those responsible for leading the 276 
development of these services—the ‘focal actors’—and other stakeholders responded to the 277 
changing institutional environment. The four services in question had their roots in a national 278 
government initiative in 2004 which aimed to encourage the ‘mainstreaming’ of clinical-279 
genetics knowledge across the English NHS. This initiative (Secretary of State for Health 2003) 280 
provided pump-priming funding to 27 pilot services, each of which sought to introduce a new 281 
approach to delivering genetics services in its locality—for example by changing the way risk 282 
assessment or counselling was provided—but maintaining professional control over this. Our 283 
team evaluated the initiative, studying the changes attempted in a theoretical sample of 11 of 284 
the services. The initiative ran on the basis that successful services would be sustained using 285 
local monies, and host organizations committed to this as a condition of funding. However, in 286 
the event, when pilot funding ended in 2007, only a minority of services were sustained, 287 
including just four of the 11 we studied (see Table 1). The challenges inherent in sustaining 288 
organizational innovations are an area of significant policy interest in the UK (e.g. Buchanan 289 
et al. 2007), and we therefore developed, and succeeded in obtaining external funding for, a 290 
follow-up study that revisited the four sustained services post-pilot, to examine in more detail 291 
what had made a difference in their successful continuation. This paper derives from both the 292 
original evaluation and the follow-up study, offering a longitudinal analysis of the work of 293 
actors involved in the four services covering the seven-year period 2005-2011. While we lack 294 
the data from the seven discontinued services to consider them in detail in this paper, Table 1 295 
shows how they resemble and differ from our sample of four according to key variables, and 296 
briefly summarizes the reasons for their termination. 297 
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[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 298 
For our original evaluation, our sample was driven by a theoretical approach to obtain 299 
variation in key variables of interest, inter alia host organization (e.g. hospitals versus primary-300 
care organization), professional affiliation of focal actor (e.g. doctors, nurses), and disciplinary 301 
affiliation (e.g. specialist geneticists, other specialist clinicians, generalists). These variables 302 
are highlighted as pertinent in the existing literature (e.g. Battilana 2011); they were 303 
supplemented in our sampling strategy by other variables raised as of potential significance in 304 
discussions with our funder, such as clinical focus of the service and amount of funding 305 
allocated. Cases exhibiting various combinations of these variables were sampled to facilitate 306 
cross-case comparison. Our follow-up study included all sites from this original sample that 307 
were sustained with further funding beyond the pilot period (4/11). While they differ in detail, 308 
all four embodied a professionally led approach to improving genetics provision by breaking 309 
down organizational boundaries (e.g. between specialisms or between primary and secondary 310 
care) that gave rise to disjointed provision. Given that the focal actors in each case were 311 
successful in obtaining post-pilot funding where their peers in the other seven services failed, 312 
they could be seen as exceptional; but as our findings demonstrate, they did not have significant 313 
power over local decision-making. In one site (Bolbourne), ongoing funding ceased after six 314 
months; in the other three, it continues today. 315 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 316 
Table 2 summarizes the four cases. Of particular note in the composition of our sample 317 
are the similarities and differences in two dimensions: professional allegiance of focal actor; 318 
and organizational host. Whereas Ashover’s focal actor was a nurse by training who had more 319 
recently become involved in a managerial capacity in her organization, the other three cases 320 
were led by physicians of varying backgrounds. The focal actor in Bolbourne was a general 321 
practitioner (family physician), while Carsridge was led by a clinical geneticist and Dovington 322 
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by a specialist physician in the ‘mainstream’ clinical area into which genetics provision was 323 
being incorporated (we leave this unspecified to protect participant anonymity). Nurses are of 324 
lower status than doctors in English healthcare as worldwide (Battilana 2011); the 325 
intraprofessional hierarchy within medicine tends to place specialists above generalists, 326 
although the changes afoot in the English system explicitly sought to raise the standing of 327 
general practitioners and increase their influence on resource allocation (Secretary of State for 328 
Health 2006). The host organizations in Ashover and Bolbourne were both primary care 329 
organizations: PCTs responsible for budget-holding and resource allocation, but which also at 330 
the start of the period provided some services in-house, including these genetics services. 331 
Carsridge and Dovington’s services were hosted by acute hospital trusts: large hospital 332 
organizations providing services to the populations covered by several PCTs. 333 
Both studies used a combination of qualitative methods, drawing primarily on in-depth 334 
interviews with key actors (e.g. focal actors, others involved in service delivery, those in key 335 
decision-making and budget-holding roles beyond the services), supplemented by 336 
observational data and document collection and analysis. In total, across the two studies, we 337 
undertook 83 interviews over four time points, broken down as shown in Table 2. For the 338 
original evaluation, we undertook the majority of interviews in 2005-6 (hereafter referred to as 339 
T1), with follow-up interviews in 2008 (T2). For the second study, we undertook further 340 
interviews in 2010 (T3) and 2011 (T4). Thus our data offer a longitudinal perspective on the 341 
trajectories of the four cases spanning seven years, albeit with data collection unevenly 342 
distributed across the period. Interviews ranged from approximately 30 to 130 minutes, with 343 
an average length of around one hour. Our topic guide in the original evaluation covered a wide 344 
range of issues, most notably for this paper the rationale for the service, how it related to and 345 
modified existing provision, relationships with key stakeholders and organizations, plans for 346 
the future, and (at T2) progress towards maintaining provision post-pilot. In the follow-up study 347 
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our topic guide focused more specifically on the trials and tribulations of sustaining these small 348 
service innovations in a changing environment, the degree to which they had evolved in their 349 
service models, and the organizational, financial and relational work that had been done and 350 
was anticipated to maintain their existence. 351 
All interviews were transcribed in full. They were analysed using an approach informed 352 
by the constant-comparative method (Charmaz 2007), with specific attention directed towards 353 
certain ‘sensitizing concepts’—ideas that had informed our thinking in developing the study, 354 
derived from prior conversations, analysis of policy documents, and the existing literature on 355 
healthcare and organizational change—covering the social, professional, organizational and 356 
policy influences on service innovation and sustainability. We thus developed themes both 357 
inductively and deductively, to cover issues derived from existing conceptual frameworks, but 358 
also issues that emerged from close, repeated readings of the data sources. GPM and SW both 359 
read the source materials several times over, and GPM then led coding and analysis using 360 
NVivo software. This involved an initial ‘broad-brush’ coding of all documents to identify 361 
portions that offered potential insights for the purpose of this paper (since a substantial 362 
proportion of the material from the original evaluation was not relevant), informed by our 363 
existing knowledge. In discussion with the other authors, GPM then undertook several rounds 364 
of more refined, inductive coding, firstly coding items in terms of the actions described by 365 
interviewees in relation to the development and sustaining of the services (Charmaz 2007), and 366 
then a further round of more theoretically oriented coding that sought to identify the influence 367 
and enactment of different logics in the activities interviewees described and the way they 368 
justified them. He then developed case histories describing the trajectories of the four cases 369 
over the period studied, which he discussed with co-authors before returning for a final round 370 
of coding, merging some existing codes and disaggregating others. 371 
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Findings 372 
We present our findings over three sections. First, we examine the way the services were set 373 
up, and the impact of the rapid shift in the policy landscape for the continued legitimacy of 374 
services premised on a professional logic. Next, we consider the focal actors’ response to this 375 
challenge, which was differentially successful across the four cases, with very different 376 
outcomes in terms of the logics that were most evident in actors’ behaviour. Finally, we explore 377 
the reasons for this. By examining the data from across the cases in more detail, we suggest 378 
that the answer lies neither in the constellation of logics present in the field, nor solely in the 379 
creative capacity of the focal actors to make instrumental use of these logics, but in a 380 
confluence of micro- and macro-level circumstances, mediated at the meso (organizational) 381 
level, that meant that institutional repertoires that were accessible and held legitimacy in some 382 
cases were beyond the reach of focal actors in others. 383 
Professionally led services and shifting institutional logics 384 
When originally designed and initiated in 2004 through central government funding, all four 385 
services embraced a model premised on professional ownership and accountability. The white 386 
paper that announced the initiative had emphasised the role of clinical professionals in devising 387 
new genetics services (Secretary of State for Health 2003), and accordingly, all the projects 388 
funded were led by clinicians, not managers—primarily clinical geneticists, but also other 389 
physicians, and nurses. Focal actors emphasised the centrality of a professional ethic in their 390 
approaches to delivering the new services, though in slightly different ways. In Carsridge and 391 
Dovington, they stressed the importance of ensuring that genetic knowledge was mainstreamed 392 
in a way that maintained or enhanced specialist involvement, rather than reducing it to a 393 
protocolized approach that might be more in line with the corporate logic. In the two primary-394 
care cases, Ashover and Bolbourne, the emphasis was on integrating genetics into a generalist 395 
model of care, emphasising holism and the wider public health: 396 
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“We were aware right from the early stages that patients really didn’t get a terribly good 397 
deal in terms of any kind of comprehensive service. There was very little continuity and 398 
I thought we could do a better job.” (Focal actor (mainstream physician), Dovington, 399 
T1) 400 
“Anybody who’s concerned that they’ve got a family history of cancer and are at risk 401 
can be referred into our service. […] We also do a lot of health promotion so we don’t 402 
actually just talk about cancer, we also talk about things related to cancer like diet, like 403 
giving up smoking, sunbathing, those types of things.” (Focal actor (nurse-manager), 404 
Ashover, T1) 405 
Each focal actor thus enacted the professional logic in the way they set up their service, albeit 406 
with variations on the theme reflecting their professional affiliation: it was presented in terms 407 
of esoteric expertise by the specialist physicians in Carsridge and Dovington, but in terms of 408 
holistic, generalist care by the nurse and family physician in Ashover and Bolbourne. 409 
 Each focal actor had obtained agreement in principle from their host organization to 410 
continue to fund the service following the pilot period. The shift in the policy landscape from 411 
2005, however, threw such plans into disarray. An increased emphasis on markets and targets, 412 
and the organizational changes that accompanied it, had a marked effect on genetics service 413 
developments, and meant that commitments made years earlier counted for little: 414 
“We’ve gone from a position of completely unprecedented investment in the health 415 
service, where it was attractive to invest money in bits of the service which had not 416 
previously had large amounts of money invested in them. [… But now] we’re in a 417 
position where it’s not clear how we’re going to continue to provide what everybody 418 
would regard as core NHS services, [so] slightly unusual developments are much less 419 
easy to make.” (Director, genetics service, Bolbourne, T3) 420 
There was a tangible shift in the language of those in decision-making positions in all four 421 
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cases, towards an acknowledgement of the need for parsimony and demonstrable value. 422 
Professionally led services, in the view of these stakeholders, needed to address changing 423 
expectations around, for example, consumer-responsiveness in a competitive environment that 424 
mirrored the market logic: 425 
“The mistake I’ve seen a lot of services make is that they try really, really hard to 426 
establish because they think there’s a need to convince people, there’s a need to get 427 
funded, and they start seeing stakeholders, but then it stops. […] Products don’t survive 428 
in the market very long unless they inhabit the environment they’re in, learn from it and 429 
modify based on their clients’ continuously changing needs. And that’s what 430 
differentiates successful products from not-successful products.” (Director of 431 
Commissioning, Ashover, T3) 432 
As they reached the end of their pilot funding and considered how to maintain their services, 433 
therefore, focal actors found themselves in an environment that had changed markedly. The 434 
rise of the market and corporate logics in policy demanded evidence of cost savings or cost-435 
effectiveness, and this posed a threat to services founded on a different logic. But as we see 436 
next, the ultimate outcome of this shift in logics at the field level for the four services was very 437 
different. 438 
The outcomes: domination; resistance; transformation 439 
Focal actors in all four cases worked hard to defend the services they had built, and secure 440 
continued funding for them in this changing environment, while ensuring they remained true 441 
to the professional logic on which the services had been founded. As noted above, all four 442 
succeeded initially in obtaining ongoing funding, in contrast to their peers. But beyond this, 443 
their success varied. 444 
At one extreme, in Bolbourne, despite the focal actor’s extensive efforts, local budget-445 
holders decided six months later to terminate their funding for the service. The focal actor, a 446 
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family physician, made robust arguments for the continued importance of her service and the 447 
holistic understanding of the place of genetics in wider primary care that it promoted,. 448 
Alongside a costed business case, her efforts included compiling evidence of impact in the 449 
form of “e-mails, comments from other GPs saying, ‘This is great, the website’s fantastic, 450 
really good about having the advice line’,” “pictures in the [local] newspapers saying what a 451 
wonderful thing,” and lobbying commissioners and genetics specialists: “I think we covered 452 
most avenues really.” But as she bluntly reflected in her final (T4) interview: 453 
“From an outside perspective perhaps it seemed a bit woolly what I was doing, but I 454 
think it was actually much more worthwhile to focus my attentions in that way. It wasn’t 455 
as sexy and didn’t look quite as good; I wasn’t seeing all these patients.” 456 
Essentially, she found that arguments premised on a logic of professionalism failed to hold 457 
sway in an environment now dominated by concerns around efficiency and throughput (“seeing 458 
all these patients”). Her view was confirmed by the decision-makers themselves. The director 459 
of the genetics service felt that the focal actor was “selling something which […] 460 
commissioners didn’t want to buy” (T3). Another decision-maker was even franker: 461 
“It isn’t going to release huge savings, […] so when commissioners are prioritizing, it 462 
will not tick all the boxes I’m afraid. It’s undeniable that well informed GP specialists 463 
able to support their GP colleagues can have an impact both on improving resources 464 
but more importantly making sure that patients get the right service at the right time, 465 
but I think in the current economic situation it’s going to be difficult to see many 466 
primary-care genetics services being established.” (Primary care commissioning lead, 467 
T3) 468 
Further work undertaken by the focal actor to resurrect her service following termination of 469 
funding was unsuccessful, and by the end of the study period she was resigned to the fact that 470 
“it’s just gone back to how it was. The website is the only lasting legacy” (T4). 471 
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At the other extreme, in Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors were much more 472 
successful in defending the professional logic in the changing field, such that their services 473 
remained in place, largely unaffected by the wider environment and the rise of the market logic 474 
for the duration of the period studied. As the focal actor in Dovington put it, with some surprise, 475 
“actually to move us into the whole commissioning process and to make it sustainable was a 476 
far more fraught process potentially than it actually was” (T3). The model of service delivery 477 
continued to follow a professional logic, with patient-centredness taking precedence over 478 
throughput or efficiency savings: 479 
“Patient satisfaction is high, clinic sizes are relatively small although efficient, and time 480 
spent with medical staff and nursing staff is higher and so we get a much better patient 481 
experience and outcome with all of that. We’re always going to be able to be criticized 482 
on the basis that we’re providing a luxury service as opposed to an economy service, 483 
but they’re a very vulnerable group of patients.” (Clinical geneticist, T4) 484 
Similarly, in Carsridge, ongoing funding was secured and the service remained faithful to the 485 
original design, without any challenge to the professionally determined service model: “I don’t 486 
think there was ever any major problems: it just seemed to happen” (Genetic counsellor, T3). 487 
Only minor changes were instigated, such as adjustment of the skill mix to enhance the 488 
professional responsibilities of the clinical staff: “the function of the team is exactly the same, 489 
but we have up-skilled one of the administrators to take some of the more mundane activities 490 
from [the clinicians]. And I suppose that’s the biggest change actually” (Focal actor (clinical 491 
geneticist), T3). Whereas in Bolbourne, adherence to the professional logic meant that the 492 
service was seen as anachronistic by budget-holders (“selling something which […] 493 
commissioners didn’t want to buy”), the services in Carsridge and Dovington retained 494 
legitimacy with key decision-makers despite their avowedly professionally driven ethos: 495 
“To me it’s actually really pretty streamlined, a very efficient service. […] What 496 
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they’ve done in terms of bringing things up into the twenty-first century is of value to 497 
the population, so I think they provide a valuable service.” (Clinical director, Carsridge, 498 
T3) 499 
Between the contrasting experiences of Bolbourne, and Carsridge and Dovington, lay 500 
Ashover’s. Here, funding was sustained throughout the period, but achieving this required 501 
fundamental changes to the ethos and delivery model of the service. At the behest of local 502 
decision-makers, the original holistic, public-health focus of the service gave way to something 503 
much narrower in remit, and better aligned with corporate and market expectations around 504 
efficiency and performance against specific measures. The focal actor was expected to agree 505 
to a “service specification” with “specific key performance indicators” developed with 506 
managers, “which I disagreed with but had to put them forward anyway” (T4). The service was 507 
incorporated into a managed care pathway, with a much more tightly defined service-level 508 
agreement that focused on triaging patients at possible risk of inherited cancer. Alongside this, 509 
more forensic examination of the service’s activities was introduced: “we have now a scoring 510 
of interventions, sort of whether it’s a low intervention or a high intervention, […] and they’re 511 
now reviewing that data collection as well, so there’ll be a whole new system coming out” 512 
(Focal actor (nurse-manager), T4). The positioning of the service within a managed pathway, 513 
along with this extra scrutiny and oversight for managers and commissioners, gave the service 514 
legitimacy with key decision-makers. It was now aligned with normative conceptualizations of 515 
how to deliver efficient and well managed healthcare, as part of a defined pathway that offered 516 
a cheaper alternative to hospital-based care: 517 
“Community services we know are darn site cheaper than secondary and tertiary care 518 
services. […] It’s a community-led service, you know, and necessarily, it’s broken 519 
down the boundaries between primary care and secondary care. So it’s a pathway-520 
driven service from the community which ticks all the boxes at the moment of things 521 
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being community-driven, closer to home.” (Associate medical director, T3) 522 
Besides more focused performance management, this also brought a much stricter set of 523 
eligibility criteria for patients. For example, the service took fewer self-referrals from worried 524 
patients who had not been screened by their family physicians, and was contemplating stopping 525 
self-referrals altogether since budget-holders were unlikely to see this is as appropriate 526 
expenditure: 527 
“When we first started in the pilot phase, it was very much self-referrals that 528 
outweighed any professional referrals. Whereas now I would say that’s reversed and 529 
self-referrals probably come at the bottom of the referral rate and it’s secondary-care 530 
and GP referrals that probably top. […] I don’t know how GPs will feel about patients 531 
referring themselves in, because they’re not going to have control of that budget. (Focal 532 
actor (nurse-manager), T4) 533 
This process of adaptation to the new realities of the market continued through time. Between 534 
T3 and T4, as part of its continued funding, the service was incorporated into a different 535 
organization with much greater managerial capacity than its original host, and with a strong 536 
market orientation: 537 
“[New host organization] have an operating model which they would apply to all of 538 
their products. So […] they’ll have to change certain aspects of the way they just run 539 
the service to fit in with their corporate model. […] If they can’t robustly describe the 540 
value this service would have on the whole of cancer care, then the more likely the risk 541 
that this service won’t be commissioned.” (Commissioner, T3) 542 
 The future for the service looked more secure—it had reinvented itself as part of an integrated 543 
care pathway with a tightly defined remit and expectations around efficient resource use—but 544 
this had meant fundamental changes to its service-delivery model. From her original affiliation 545 
with the professional logic, the focal actor had been forced to fundamentally realign herself to 546 
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the corporate and market logics, in terms of both the discursive justification, and the service 547 
provided. 548 
Making sense of the contrasting outcomes 549 
From similar starting positions, then, the four cases exhibited divergent trajectories. While the 550 
focal actors in Carsridge and Dovington continued to espouse the professional logic, and 551 
maintained services formed in a professional image despite the changing environment, in 552 
Bolbourne the focal actor’s fidelity to the professional logic saw her service terminated, while 553 
in Ashover the focal actor had to embrace alternative logics to secure her service’s future (see 554 
also Table 3). How might these divergent outcomes be explained? 555 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 556 
In all four cases, hard evidence about the efficiency or effectiveness of the services was 557 
in short supply (see self-citation). Evidence of this nature was difficult for focal actors to 558 
generate—partly because they had never devised their services with such a crudely economic 559 
calculus in mind, but also because generating such evidence was difficult in genetics with its 560 
long-term, not short-term, outcomes: “it’s difficult to demonstrate their value or the amount of 561 
money they’re saving,” as a manager in Carsridge acknowledged (T3). Explanations for the 562 
divergent outcomes premised on a rationalistic understanding of organizational decision-563 
making can therefore be discounted. 564 
Yet while the services in Ashover, Carsridge and Dovington may have been no more 565 
cost-effective than that in Bolbourne, we have seen that as far as key decision-makers were 566 
concerned, they were more in keeping with how a service of this nature should look. Although 567 
all services lacked a clear economic rationale that would offer a firm alignment with the 568 
expectations of the market logic, this was more problematic for some than others. From our 569 
data, a number of explanations for this might be invoked, with differing degrees of support. 570 
First, it might be argued that the divergent outcomes were down to the differential skill 571 
24 
 
of the focal actors in making the case for their services. Other micro-level studies have noted 572 
the importance of actors who are “highly reflexive and somewhat creative in interpreting the 573 
pressures for institutional change” (Bévort & Suddaby 2015; cf. Smets & Jarzabkowski 2013; 574 
self-citation), and going against the ‘institutional grain’ clearly requires capacity for lateral 575 
thinking and persuasive ability. There was some support for this notion in our data. One 576 
decision-maker in Bolbourne intimated that the focal actor did not have “the right personality 577 
to go out there and engage people and get people stirred up” (T3). However, it was clearly not 578 
the case that any of the focal actors was naïve about the changing environment they were 579 
facing: over the course of our four interviews with each of them, they demonstrated an astute, 580 
reflexive understanding the changing healthcare system and the risks this posed to their 581 
services. And of course, unlike the seven other services sampled in our original evaluation, 582 
these focal actors had at least obtained initial local funding beyond the pilot monies provided 583 
by central government. 584 
A second plausible explanation is that the status and power enjoyed by the focal actors 585 
affected their ability to defy the vagaries of the shifting institutional prescriptions. Certainly 586 
the position of nurses in terms of professional status, authority and autonomy is weaker than 587 
that of physicians, in England and elsewhere (see, e.g., Battilana 2011). Socio-demographic 588 
characteristics such as gender may also contribute to this positional power. But while 589 
Ashover’s focal actor was a (white, female) nurse, there was little to differentiate the status of 590 
those in Bolbourne, Carsridge and Dovington, all of whom were doctors (white and female in 591 
Bolbourne and Dovington, white and male in Carsridge), albeit from different subspecialities. 592 
Indeed, if anything, the changes afoot over the study period—which saw more powers given 593 
to family physicians in terms of funding allocation, and encouragement of community-based 594 
over hospital-based care (Secretary of State for Health 2006)—should have raised the power 595 
of Bolbourne’s focal actor vis-à-vis that of Carsridge and Dovington’s. 596 
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A more convincing and comprehensive explanation is possible if we focus on neither 597 
actors’ social position nor their creative capacity per se, but on the consequences for these of 598 
the wider changes taking place in the field at the time. While the rise of the market logic over 599 
the period of the study applied equally across the English healthcare field, its effects at an 600 
organizational level were unequal. For the primary-care organizations that hosted the services 601 
in Ashover and Bolbourne, the rise of the market was unprecedented, and brought significant 602 
structural changes. As commissioning organizations (budget holders for the healthcare needs 603 
of the local population), they were required to relinquish their responsibility for service 604 
provision to enable competition for services that had been provided in-house. The services that 605 
had been a part of these organizations, including Ashover’s and Bolbourne’s genetics services, 606 
had to be reconstituted as financially independent standalone bodies, or incorporated into 607 
existing provider organizations. Consequently, the focal actors in Ashover and Bolbourne 608 
found themselves in the midst of a complicated process of organizational disengagement, and 609 
were cut adrift from their organizational sponsors. The focal actor in Ashover found that her 610 
new managers “didn’t have as much insight into the service and were less committed to seeing 611 
it expand” (T3), while in Bolbourne, the service’s manager had “less direct involvement” in the 612 
service, “although because there was not really anyone else to do it I did carry on to an extent” 613 
(T3). Further, and more critically, the focal actors were exposed to a range of expectations 614 
associated with the market logic that were foreign to them—and lacked the managerial support 615 
necessary to coherently argue their case in response. 616 
On the face of it, this challenge also applied to Carsridge and Dovington. However, here 617 
the services were hosted by hospitals with long experience of participating in a competitive 618 
market—and this equipped them much better to deal with the changing expectations of the new 619 
regime. The primary-care organizations in which Ashover’s and Bolbourne’s focal actors 620 
worked had only ever encountered the competitive market as budget holders, choosing between 621 
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competing bids: making a business case as a potential contractor was not something they had 622 
experienced before. As hospitals, the organizations in Carsridge and Dovington had long 623 
experience of a competitive market for secondary care that stretched back into the 1990s. Thus 624 
while the market-oriented shifts were just as dazzling to the focal actors themselves, they were 625 
surrounded by an established managerial infrastructure that was adept at managing such 626 
demands, and did not have to contend with rapid organizational change. They could rely instead 627 
on extensive managerial support—an instantiation of the corporate logic with its focus on the 628 
monitoring, audit and justification of professional activity—to deal with such shifts. 629 
The consequences for the ability of the focal actors to defend their services were 630 
profound. In Ashover and Bolbourne, they found themselves with little support and little idea 631 
of how to make a case for themselves: 632 
“Just after the pilot finished once we’d secured ongoing funding there was the 633 
commissioner-provider split, so the service went into mainstream services in the 634 
provider arm. […] I don't mean to sound derogatory, but I suppose the senior managers 635 
within the provider arm didn’t have as much insight in to the service and were less 636 
committed to seeing it expand.” (Focal actor, Ashover, T3) 637 
“My final line manager, essentially he and I put together a business plan very much on 638 
our own, and we met with the medical director and the deputy medical director and we 639 
put our case.” (Focal actor, Bolbourne, T3) 640 
In Carsridge and Dovington, focal actors enjoyed the full support of their organizations’ 641 
corporate apparatus: 642 
“The key relationship going forward […] is the relationship between our service, the 643 
business planning directorate, and their relationship with whatever commissioner 644 
organization exists after that, because we as a clinical service can’t keep up with 645 
changes in commissioning. But the business planning section do. And it’s that 646 
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relationship that’s really important.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T2) 647 
“We have had no direct dealings with commissioners at any stage, because we are part 648 
of [a wider funding] envelope, from the point of view of the service that’s provided, it’s 649 
completely embedded in [the wider service].” (Focal actor, Dovington, T4) 650 
Intriguingly, then, in Carsridge and Dovington, the presence of a well established corporate 651 
logic, manifest in the activities of the hospitals’ dedicated business-planning staff, shielded the 652 
focal actors from the full force of the market logic, and enabled them to continue to enact the 653 
professional logic in the way they ran their services. Focal actors here could rely on others 654 
around them, carriers of the corporate logic but also well versed in the language of the market 655 
logic and the expectations of financial decision-makers, to frame their projects accordingly and 656 
deflect challenges: 657 
“What we’ve been doing is pulling together our experience and our outcomes in a brief 658 
report that we can send to the business-planning department of this hospital, so that they 659 
can use that in their negotiations.” (Focal actor, Carsridge, T3) 660 
In the absence of such support, Ashover and Bolbourne faced greater challenges. Bolbourne’s 661 
focal actor floundered, but in Ashover the focal actor was able to draw on her experience as a 662 
manager—her dual embeddedness in the professional and corporate logics (Pache & Santos 663 
2013)—to reframe her service. As we have seen, though, this came at the cost of transforming 664 
the service model itself, so that it was premised not on a professional logic but on notions of 665 
efficiency and throughput. For all four focal actors, however, the ability and opportunity to 666 
invoke and make advantageous use of logics was heavily shaped—one might even say 667 
structured—by influences beyond their capacity and social position as individual agents, but 668 
below the level of the field as a whole. Organizational context and the nature of their 669 
relationship with other agents—themselves affiliated with other logics—were crucial 670 
mediators of the relationship between field-level configuration of logics and individual-level 671 
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autonomy. 672 
Discussion 673 
Our paper seeks to bridge macro-level and micro-level work on responses to institutional 674 
complexity by using comparative, longitudinal analysis to examine the conditions under which 675 
actors are able to defy changing institutional prescriptions. In particular, we show that a 676 
common ‘constellation’ of institutional logics (Goodrick & Reay 2011; Waldorff et al. 2013) 677 
could give rise to divergent outcomes at the level of practice. Constellations are thus not just 678 
‘celestial’ features of the field-level ‘sky’: the relationship between logics was also realized 679 
through the work of actors on the ‘ground’. Most notably, whereas the corporate logic aligned, 680 
as the literature predicts (Thornton 2002; [self-citation]), with the market logic in some cases, 681 
in others it proved a remarkably robust defence for the professional logic against the market 682 
logic. But none of the actors had free rein to pick and choose from the plurality of logics present 683 
in this complex field. Rather, influences above the level of the actor but below that of the field 684 
were important mediators and shapers of autonomy.  685 
As noted above, much of the micro-level work on the enactment of institutional logics 686 
‘at the coalface’ has focused on the ‘hypermuscular’ work of institutional entrepreneurs with 687 
unusual degrees of power, deriving from their social position, their “reflexivity or insight” and 688 
“their superior political and social skills” (Hardy & Maguire 2008, p.211). But even where 689 
studies have looked at the day-to-day work of lower-profile actors, they have often found a 690 
high level of autonomy, and attributed this to the creative capacity or social position of the 691 
individuals studied. For example, Bévort and Suddaby (2015) suggest that liberation from 692 
institutional prescriptions “appears to rest in the differential ability of some individuals in a 693 
common field to interpret the phenomenological fragility of logics and to be somewhat immune 694 
to their ‘totalizing’ cognitive influence.” Greenwood et al. (2011, p.349), summarizing the state 695 
of the field, submit that the ability to advance the prescriptions of one logic over others is in 696 
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part “a function of how logics are given voice within the organization; but the ability of a voice 697 
to be heard is linked to the influence of that logic’s field-level proponents over resources.” One 698 
way or another, these studies suggest that the ability to selectively enact logics derives 699 
primarily from some combination of status and creativity. But as Hallett (2010, p.67) 700 
acknowledges, this ability is produced (and denied) at a “supra-individual,” social level. And 701 
a key level at which this process takes place, we argue, is the organizational level, and 702 
particularly the way in which logics are configured and represented in organizational processes 703 
and personnel. 704 
Others have shown how organizations can act as ‘filters’, whereby different 705 
organizational units are subject to different institutional logics. Binder (2007, p.562), for 706 
example, finds that actors in different sections of the community organization she studied enact 707 
different logics, since different constellations of logics predominate: those in the housing 708 
department follow a more corporate logic, since “there are no countervailing institutional logics 709 
that staff in this department draw on.” This reflects the findings of others about how in some 710 
fields, institutional complexity is ‘segmented’: some prescriptions apply to one group of actors; 711 
others to another (e.g. Pache & Santos 2010). In other settings, collaboration across logics may 712 
be a prerequisite for organizational functioning (e.g. McPherson & Sauder 2013; Smets et al. 713 
2015). What we witness in this study, however, is a combination of what Besharov and Smith 714 
(2014) call high centrality and low compatibility: a field characterized by multiple institutional 715 
logics which must all be adhered to, and yet are mutually conflicting. This results in what they 716 
term ‘conflicted’ organizations, and they recount many examples from the literature of where 717 
this has led to organizational dysfunction or even disintegration. Yet, as Besharov and Smith 718 
(2014) argue, centrality and compatibility are not determined only at the field level: they are 719 
also a function of organizational form. Since ‘structurally differentiated hybrids’—in which 720 
the influences of different logics sit side-by-side, in different units in the same organization 721 
30 
 
(Greenwood et al. 2011)—are especially vulnerable to dysfunction (e.g. Battilana & Dorado 722 
2010; Greenwood et al. 2011), Besharov and Smith suggest two organizational interventions 723 
to mitigate this: recruiting personnel without prior institutional affiliations (to move from a 724 
structurally differentiated hybrid towards a blended hybrid, thereby reducing logic 725 
incompatibility), or reducing resource dependency by shifting strategic focus (to diminish the 726 
number of logics that must be accounted for, thereby reducing logic centrality). But these are 727 
not options for all organizations, particularly in the public services, where structural 728 
differentiation is itself necessary for legitimacy (and so blending is difficult to achieve) (see 729 
Greenwood et al. 2011, p.355), and organizational objectives are externally dictated (and so 730 
shifting strategic focus is not tenable). Logics’ influence cannot always be reduced in this way. 731 
What our findings suggest is how the tension between logics can be managed even where 732 
structural differentiation, so prone to disintegration, is necessary.  What appears crucial is the 733 
internal configuration of structurally differentiated units.  Thus in Carsridge and Dovington, 734 
the presence of carriers of the corporate logic in a separate unit—who could intervene actively 735 
to moderate its influence on their professional colleagues—paradoxically helped to secure 736 
latitude for the focal actors; the lack of such a buffering influence in Ashover and Bolbourne 737 
resulted in constraint.1 We suggest, therefore, that at least in public-service organizations, 738 
efforts to hire or socialize ‘non-affiliated’ staff to create blended hybrids that increase 739 
compatibility, or realign mission to reduce logic centrality, are likely to be forlorn or even 740 
counterproductive: attention might be more appropriately addressed to developing a cordial, 741 
interdependent and mutually beneficial relationship between carriers of logics in structurally 742 
differentiated units. Indeed, in Ashover the focal actor’s socialization (or dual embeddedness) 743 
                                                          
1 It might be noted in passing that of the seven services included in the original evaluation 
which did not obtain post-pilot funding, three had organizational set-ups involving 
collaboration between two or more host organizations (see Table 1). This may have added 
complication to the relationship among logics and their carriers, accounting in part for their 
failure to secure post-pilot funding, though we do not have the data to sustain this argument.  
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within both the professional and the corporate logic proved a mixed blessing, enabling the 744 
service to continue but only through transformation in its character. Boxenbaum and Battilana 745 
(2005, p.359) echo Besharov and Smith’s (2014) contention that staff with multiple 746 
institutional affiliations can help to reduce incompatibility and increase autonomy: “the more 747 
contexts individuals are embedded in, the more options they have available for transposing 748 
practices.” But while this helped Ashover’s focal actor avoid the termination of the service that 749 
occurred in Bolbourne, it offered her substantially less discretion than that enjoyed by the focal 750 
actors in Carsridge and Dovington. Dual embeddedness may then improve actors’ access to 751 
different logics, but it does not necessarily give them freedom of choice in enacting them. The 752 
configuration of organizations and the carriers of logics within them, not just their composition, 753 
matters, and as such structurally differentiated hybrid arrangements have the potential, at least, 754 
to reconcile conflicting logics as effectively as blended hybrids. 755 
Understood this way, the findings of other micro-level studies that have emphasised the 756 
ingenuity of individual actors might be seen in a slightly different light. For example, Murray 757 
(2010, p.379) sees the response of scientists to unfamiliar commercial pressures arising from 758 
the patenting of the genetic modification of ‘OncoMouse’ as the “sophisticated [production] of 759 
new hybrids,” in which the “expertise that allows [key actors] to transpose elements from each 760 
logic” to protect the autonomy of science was crucial. Yet it is also evident from her study that 761 
the privileged access to a wider, supportive, infrastructure—including “lawyers, TTO 762 
professionals, university counsel, and corporate executives”—was also critical to this 763 
endeavour: it was not expertise or status alone that enabled autonomy. McPherson and Sauder 764 
(2013, p.186) show that actors in a drugs court draw relatively freely upon a “shared toolkit” 765 
of logics in pursuit of their interests, but some actors are better placed than others to do so: the 766 
relational position of probation officers means they occupy a position of ‘brokerage’ that allows 767 
them privileged access to the ‘home’ logics of others, even though they lack the status of other 768 
32 
 
professional groups in the court.2 Heimer (1999, p.61) argues that in disputes about the care of 769 
neonates in intensive care, doctors’ arguments tend to overpower those of other actors because 770 
they are on their home turf, with greater knowledge of “how to get problems onto the agenda, 771 
how to propose their solutions in a persuasive way” and so on. She thus concludes that “the 772 
ranking of various professions [will shape] outcomes” of such disputes; “laws that are useful 773 
to high status professionals like physicians are more likely to be incorporated into NICU 774 
routines than laws that might be useful to lower status staff” (Heimer 1999, p.62). But our 775 
findings show that it is more than simple professional hierarchy that is important here: in itself, 776 
it is no guarantee of greater legitimacy, as the contrasting experiences of Ashover’s nurse and 777 
Bolbourne’s physician indicate. It was perhaps not then physicians’ position as “high status 778 
professionals” per se that was important in Heimer’s study, but the privileged access to wider 779 
resources and networks that this afforded. 780 
We suggest, then, that organizations—and specifically the way organizations instantiate 781 
relationships between multiple logics—thus contribute crucially not just to the availability of 782 
logics at individual level, but also to the manner in which they become available: the degree to 783 
which the appearance of a logic constrains or enables autonomy. Broadly, we propose three 784 
overarching alternative ways organizations might mediate the influence of logics, deploying a 785 
physics-based metaphor that we hope helps to convey the means by which different 786 
organizational forms may intervene in the transmission of logics. First, organizations may 787 
deflect logics, protecting those within them from the need to align with logical prescriptions. 788 
We did not see this in our study, but other studies (Binder 2007; Pache & Santos 2010; Jones 789 
1999), where organizations have the power to defy institutional expectations or buffer their 790 
members from the influence of competing logics, might be conceptualized in this way. Second, 791 
they may simply transmit logics, so that prescriptions are largely unmediated and it is left to 792 
                                                          
2 We thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing this connection to our attention. 
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individual-level actors to resolve (or fail to resolve) the contradictions between competing 793 
logics. We see this in Ashover and Bolbourne, where the professional actors were left exposed 794 
to the vagaries of new prescriptions from the market logic in the absence of an effective 795 
corporate buffer. Third, they may refract logics, altering or refocusing their influence and 796 
thereby offering some shield to individuals and opportunity for autonomy. We see this in 797 
Carsridge and Dovington, where a functional relationship between carriers of the corporate and 798 
professional logics saw the former shield the latter from some aspects of new institutional 799 
prescriptions, such that they retained autonomy. The notion of refraction has some similarities 800 
with one of the oldest concepts in the institutionalist repertoire, that of decoupling (Meyer & 801 
Rowan 1977). However, as our choice of metaphor indicates, we consider this to be more than 802 
a simple matter of one organizational unit providing legitimacy in the terms of the corporate 803 
logic, while another, decoupled unit continues its own work untainted. Rather, by refraction 804 
we mean that the institutional logic, like white light passing through a prism, is slowed, bent 805 
or even dispersed into its component parts. Thus in the cases of Carsridge and Dovington, staff 806 
in business-planning units were able to translate the requirements of the market and corporate 807 
logics into terms comprehensible to the services’ professional leads, and then reframe the 808 
professional leads’ cases back into terms that would satisfy the expectations of the corporate 809 
and market logics. This was not so much a decoupling, then, as a conscious, selective coupling. 810 
Though carriers of the corporate logic, the relationship between these business-planning units 811 
and professional clinicians was organized in a way that encouraged co-operation, enabling this 812 
refraction to take place—in stark contrast to the situation in Ashover and Bolbourne. The 813 
notions of deflection, transmission and refraction represent a tentative typology requiring 814 
validation and further development, but might serve as an initial touchstone for further 815 
investigation of the organizational-level mediation of institutional logics. 816 
For all four focal actors, then, creative capacity, professional status and embeddedness 817 
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in the rules and norms of different logics were only as good as the organizational setting and 818 
social relationships they enjoyed. Autonomy was constrained where these were lacking and 819 
enabled when these were favourable. Over the period studied, institutional prescriptions were 820 
consolidated, with greater centralization of logics and the ascendency of market and corporate 821 
logics that seemed incompatible with the professional logic. Both of these changes should work 822 
to constrain actors’ autonomy. Nevertheless, meso-level features of organizations within the 823 
field made a significant difference to the consequences for actors, maintaining latitude for some 824 
while others faced constraint (cf. Besharov & Smith 2014). We contend that attending to these 825 
features could go a long way towards explaining the disjuncture between macro- and micro-826 
level findings about the partial autonomy afforded to professionals at the coalface. 827 
Our analysis offers several suggestions for future research. In particular, we suggest that 828 
more attention to the meso-level mediators of agency, perhaps building on the typology we 829 
outline above, would help to understand how the prescriptions and openings for discretion at 830 
the field level do or do not translate into opportunities at the individual level. Further work that 831 
combines a detailed, phenomenological understanding of micro-level activity with comparison 832 
of similar or divergent contexts would be helpful. Relatedly, further conceptual development 833 
of Thornton et al.’s (2012, p.7) notion of “avenues for partial autonomy” would be helpful in 834 
reconciling macro- and micro-level work in the field of neo-institutionalism. As noted above, 835 
while many macro-level studies claim to show how institutional complexity affords 836 
opportunities for autonomy, they often remain steadfastly structuralist in the way they describe 837 
these (e.g. Waldorff et al. 2013). Finally, we strongly endorse Greenwood et al.’s (2011) call 838 
for research that embraces the impact of the coexistence of more than two logics, and Thornton 839 
and Ocasio’s (2008) point that what constitutes a logic needs to be carefully considered by 840 
those seeking to study their effects. The market and corporate logics appear, on the face of it, 841 
to present a concerted threat to the professional logic in rapidly changing fields such as 842 
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healthcare. Indeed, others have analysed their impact collectively: for example Reay and 843 
Hinings’ (2005, p.358) logic of ‘business-like healthcare’ combines elements of both. But we 844 
show that the experience of the two logics can diverge in different contexts, and that they do 845 
not necessarily operate synergistically in practice. We therefore recommend careful 846 
disaggregation of logics (and perhaps their constituent elements) in future studies. 847 
Conclusion 848 
Through comparative study of the trajectories of four change initiatives in a complex 849 
organizational field, we have sought in this paper to contribute to the institutional logics 850 
literature by examining the divergent consequences of a common constellation of logics for 851 
actors in different organizational contexts. Actor autonomy, so often valorized in micro-level 852 
studies of institutional logics in action, depended greatly on mediating factors at the meso level: 853 
opportunities for autonomy were determined neither at the field level nor in the status and 854 
creativity of individual actors. Rather, organizations—not just as containers of carriers of logics 855 
(Besharov & Smith 2014) but more importantly, as configurations of relationships between 856 
those carriers—constituted a prism which could act to transmit field-level institutional 857 
prescriptions into micro-level constraints, or refract them into something more pliable and 858 
productive. Further research taking a ‘nested’ case-study approach—studying multiple cases 859 
across two more fields where logics are arranged in different constellations—may be fruitful 860 
in adding further nuance to our understanding of how logics facilitate or obstruct discretion, 861 
and with what consequences for day-to-day practice and indeed reproduction and change in 862 
organizational fields. 863 
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Table 1: Overview of the 11 pilots included in the original evaluation 985 
 Stream Pilot lead Profession 
of lead 
Host organization(s) Continued 
post-pilot? 
Reasons for non-continuation 
Ashover Cancer genetics  Nurse by background; 
now manager 
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Bolbourne General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner  Physician Primary care 
organization 
Yes  
Carsridge Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Hospital organization Yes  
Dovington Service development Specialist physician Physician Hospital organization Yes  
E Cancer genetics Nurse Nurse Consortium of primary 
care organizations 
No Reconfiguration of primary care 
organizations and consequent failure to 
agree to continued funding 
F Cancer genetics Clinical geneticist Physician Two hospital 
organizations 
No Failure to agree to continued funding 
(scaled down version maintained in one 
hospital) 
G Service development Specialist physician Physician Three hospital 
organizations 
No Conflict over allocation of resources and 
professional roles among host organizations 
leads to agreement to discontinue 
H Service development Specialist physician Nurse Hospital organization No Project ceased at end of funding; results 
included in guidelines for referrals to 
genetics service 
I General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Always intended to be a time-limited 
educational intervention 
J General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Geneticists refuse to support (see [self-
citation]) 
K General practitioner 
with a special interest 
General practitioner Physician Primary care 
organization 
No Limited ongoing ‘associate’ role under 
geneticist super vision (see [self-citation]) 
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Table 2: Summary of the four cases 988 
 Service model Profession of 
focal actor 
Initial host Number of interviews 
T1 T2 T3 T4 Total 
Ashover Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage using primary care-based staff, and wider health-promotion advice aimed 
at high-risk groups  
Nurse Primary care 
organization 
12 
 
2 
 
12 
 
2 
 
28 
Bolbourne General practitioner with a special interest: provides training and advice to other 
GPs to inform proper management and referral of patients with suspected 
genetic conditions 
Physician Primary care 
organization 
5 2 7 1 15 
Carsridge Implemented a national model to provide cancer-genetics risk assessment and 
triage provided by secondary care-based staff, replacing ad hoc provision by 
oncologists and surgeons 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
12 2 10 2 26 
Dovington New multidisciplinary clinic, incorporating mainstream and specialist consultant-
led care, for a group with a genetic disorder previously seen in separate clinics 
Physician Hospital 
organization 
6 2 5 1 14 
989 
41 
 
Table 3: The differential translation of institutional change across cases 990 
 Time Ashover Bolbourne Carsridge and Dovington 
Focal actor  Nurse/manager Physician Physician 
Organizational 
host 
 PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3); 
community provider organization (T4) 
PCT (T1); PCT provider arm (T2-T3) Hospital organization 
Original logic 
espoused by 
focal actors 
T1 
(2005-6) 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring holistic care and 
addressing public health, rather than 
providing a narrow care pathway delivered 
by deskilled occupational group 
Professional 
Emphasis on utilizing broad skills of a family 
physician to facilitate holistic care, rather 
than replicating work done by lower-status 
occupational groups. 
Professional 
Emphasis on ensuring patient-centred care 
delivered by a highly skilled professional 
team, rather than a narrow care pathway 
delivered by deskilled occupational group 
Impact of rise of 
market logic 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic exacerbates 
Market logic conflicts with professional 
logic; corporate logic mitigates 
Response of 
focal actors 
T2-T3 
(2008-10) 
Focal actor adapts behaviour to comply 
with market and corporate logics 
Focal actor defends alignment with 
professional logic 
Focal actors draw on corporate apparatus 
to shelter service from market logic 
Outcome T3-T4 
(2010-11) 
Service is transformed in character: 
reflects market and corporate logics 
Service is discontinued: focal actor’s 
defence fails to deflect market logic 
Services are maintained unaltered: 
corporate logic shields professional logic  
 991 
